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Abstract*
Geographical relocation of ventures, together with rates of firm formation and closure,
determine the entrepreneurial population dynamics of a region. However, venture
migration has remained largely unaddressed by prior entrepreneurship scholars. This
paper draws from theoretical frameworks and prior findings in the economic demography
literature to explore policy and environmental determinants of regional venture migration
rates, referred to as entrepreneurial transience. Using county-level data for the state of
Ohio, we show that local taxation is an important driver of entrepreneurial transience. In
particular, local income tax rates are found to be negatively related to subsequent net
transience – i.e., venture migration deficits or surpluses. Local business property taxes
also influence net transience, but the direction of their impact depends on the average
income level in the locale.
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EXPLAINING ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSIENCE: THE ROLE OF LOCAL
POLICY

Entrepreneurship has long been claimed to be the driving force of economic
development. Audretsch & Keilbach (2004), for example, show that entrepreneurship
capital is positively and significantly related to labor productivity. Thurik (1999) relates
entrepreneurship to higher rates of employment growth. Mueller (2007) demonstrates a
positive statistically significant relationship between entrepreneurship and annual
economic growth. Michelacci (2003) develops a model that positively links
entrepreneurship and innovation. Reynolds, Bygrave, & Autio, (2004) demonstrate a
positive association between entrepreneurship and GDP dynamics. Entrepreneurship
literature is thus fairly unambiguous in assigning positive economic and social returns to
entrepreneurial activity.
But do we understand all the events that contribute to the accumulation of
entrepreneurial ventures in a region. The entrepreneurship literature offers several useful
frameworks and insights about the determinants of regional start-up rates (e.g., Acs &
Szerb, 2007; Dubini, 1989; Okamuro & Kobayashi, 2006; Reynolds, Miller, & Maki,
1995; Santarelli & Piergiovanni, 1995) and – to some extent – entrepreneurial failure
(e.g., Laitinen, 1992; Littunen, Storhammar, & Nenonen, 1998; Watson & Everett, 1996).
However, firms may also leave their region of origin and move to locations that are
perceived as more desirable (Stam, 2007). Relocation of local ventures out of a region
subtracts from the region’s (net) firm formation rates, while migration of ventures into
the region complements local founding rates. Thus, the geographical movement of firms,
together with rates of firm formation and closure, determine the number of ventures in a
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region. This aspect of entrepreneurial populations (i.e., venture mobility or transience)
has remained largely unaddressed by prior entrepreneurship scholars.
There are several reasons why it is important to fill this gap in the prior
entrepreneurship literature and gain a better understanding of entrepreneurial transience
(i.e., aggregate venture migration rates), as well as of its antecedents and consequences.
First, even though there are no studies of venture migration in the entrepreneurship
literature, this phenomenon was a subject of study in mainstream economic geography in
the 1960’s and 70’s and has enjoyed renewed interest as part of an emerging industrial
demography or economic demography literature (e.g., Brouwer, Mariotti, & Van
Ommeren, 2004; Knoben & Oerlemans, 2008; Martin, 1999; Pellenbarg, Van Wissen, &
Van Dijk, 2002; Stam, 2007). Findings from this literature suggest that, despite the costs
involved, firm migration flows are sizeable and have grown over time in some countries
(Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000). For example, an average of 1.6% of U.K. firms were
reported to migrate, annually, during the 1988-1999 period (Mariotti & Pen, 2002)1. As
argued above, such migration flows will directly affect the rates of accumulation of
entrepreneurial ventures in an area, above and beyond that which is attributable to firm
starts and failures.
Second, the effects of entrepreneurial transience on local economic development
are likely to be disproportionately important. For example, historically, relocated firms
are reported to provide between 10 and 25-30 percent of a locale’s employment
opportunities (Pellenbarg et al, 2002). Unlike new firms for which the probability of
failure is fairly significant (Gaskill, Van Auken, & Manning, 1993; Watson & Everett,
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This statistic reflects venture migration proper –i.e., it excludes companies branching out to new areas
without eliminating their pre-existing location.
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1996), transient firms have overcome early start-up stages and have prevailed in their
original location (donor region), so that they are more likely to make robust contributions
to the recipient region’s economy.
Third and finally, it is possible that the factors making the area attractive to
startups differ from those required to retain such firms or lure transient ventures into the
region. If extant knowledge regarding regional determinants of firm formation does not
generalize to the case of entrepreneurial transience, and if transient ventures have
significant effects on regional economic outcomes, it follows that we have an imperfect
understanding of the conditions that will lead to effective economic development of a
region.
In particular, tax policies developed by county or municipal governments to
stimulate new venture creation in a locale may have unintended venture migration
consequences. For example, prior research suggests that greater income taxation fosters
new firm creation by making self-employment more attractive than wage and salary work
(Blau, 1987; Cullen & Gordon, 2007; Long, 1982; Parker, 1996; Pestieau & Possen 1991,
1992). Once established, however, small firm owners report taxation to be among their
gravest concerns (Phillips & Wade, 2008); and income taxation, in particular, has been
found to be negatively related to the growth of small firms (Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider,
& Rosen, 2000, 2001). Thus, given differences in taxation across neighboring areas,
higher local income taxes may lead to greater new firm formation rates, but also greater
propensity of native ventures to seek tax advantages elsewhere, resulting in ambiguous
effects on economic development.
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In this paper we seek to draw attention to the phenomenon of entrepreneurial
transience, and take a first step toward investigating its regional determinants. While
controlling for likely environmental antecedents, our focus is on tax policy variables that
may be manipulated to influence local economic development. In particular, we study
the effects of local property, income, and sales tax rates, as well as tax abatement
schemes, on (net) entrepreneurial transience. Using multi-source data from 88 Ohio
counties for the period from 2000 to 2004, we show that local tax policies have a
significant impact on venture migration rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we define the concepts
of venture migration and entrepreneurial transience. Next, we discuss prior relocation
theory and findings in the economic geography literature and formulate testable
hypotheses about the impact of local taxation on net transience. After that, we introduce
the sample, measures and methods employed in our study. The paper concludes with a
discussion of results, implications for entrepreneurship research, policy, and practice, and
possible avenues for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Venture Migration
Venture migration refers to a firm’s decision to leave its original location in
geographic area A and move its entire operations to a different location in geographic
area B (Pellenbarg et al, 2002). In the economic demography literature this is also
referred to as firm relocation (Pellenbarg, 2005), complete relocation (Brouwer et al.,
2004), or transfer moves (Pellenbarg et al., 2002). Venture migration is distinct from
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business expansion –also referred to as partial relocation (Brouwer et al., 2004).
Migrating firms abandon their original locales while expanding firms retain their ‘nest’
and simply establish new branches elsewhere.
Prior demography research shows that expansion is favored by larger firms, while
migration is rather the purview of small, younger, single-site firms (Brouwer et al., 2004;
Pellenbarg et al., 2002). For example, in the Netherlands, the average size of the migrant
firm in the period 1994-95 was 2.8 employees (Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000). Venture
migration also tends to be executed across neighboring areas or regions, and it hardly
occurs over long distances (Brouwer et al., 2004; Knoben, 2008). Migration costs are
likely to increase with distance. In particular, proximate relocations minimize the need to
replace and re-train employees (Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000). Another of the key
findings in economic demography is that migration rates vary by industry: Firms in
industries where demand does not necessarily have a strong local component (such as
manufacturing, construction, wholesale, and business services), exhibit higher migration
rates. In turn, firms in industries that are more dependent on local customers (such as the
retail trades, personal services, finance, and insurance and real state) are less transient
(Wasylenko, 1980; Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000).
Entrepreneurial Transience
Here we introduce the terms entrepreneurial transience to refer to the aggregate
rate of migration of a particular population of firms. Thus, we use ‘venture migration’ to
refer to the individual, firm-level event; while ‘entrepreneurial transience’ designates the
population-level attribute that results from the combined firm-level actions during a
particular period of time.
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Entrepreneurial transience includes both inflows of firms to the focal area as well
as outflows from the focal area to other areas. Although it would be interesting to study
the effects of local policies on migration inflow and outflow rates separately, in this paper
we focus on the balance between the two, which we refer to as net entrepreneurial
transience. The latter is defined as the relative change in the number of ventures in a
locale due to migration flows. When a locale attracts more migrant firms than it loses, it
will exhibit positive net entrepreneurial transience. If more firms exit the locale than
relocate into it, the locale’s net entrepreneurial transience will be negative.
In particular, our study focuses on net entrepreneurial transience across countylevel enterprise populations (i.e., relative migration surpluses/deficits emanating from
inter-county migration flows).
Relocation Theory
Economic geography research demonstrates that location considerations rarely
determine the choice of a site for new businesses (Pellenbarg et al, 2002). New firms are
likely to be started where the entrepreneurs themselves reside (Pellenbarg, 2005) or tend
to be co-located next to existing clusters of businesses in search of agglomeration-related
benefits (Feldman, 1999). After start-up, however, the entrepreneurial venture may
discover that other location(s) would be more favorable in terms of greater expected
revenues or lesser costs and, thus, may consider venture migration. Indeed, due to
environmental changes over time (e.g., changing factor prices or external conditions such
as congestion), firms are unlikely to occupy their optimal location without relocation.
Nevertheless, given costs and risks of relocation (e.g., it might involve the loss of key

6

personnel or major customer relations), firms are resistant to move and many will remain
in a suboptimal site (Pellenbarg et al, 2002).
In this literature firm migration is characterized as a complex process involving a
series of choices (e.g., Van Wissen, 2000). Most firm relocation studies distinguish
between push factors, which cause the firm to re-evaluate its original location in the first
place; and pull factors, which attract the firm to its destination location. Push factors
include both internal and external factors, while pull factors are mostly external (i.e.,
environmental) variables. Common internal push factors are firm growth, and thus the
need for expansion of facilities, as well as changes in market orientation or in the
technology of production leading to different requirements in terms of economies of scale
or access to key inputs or resources (Knoben, 2008). Typical external push/pull factors
include market conditions, cost or quality of factors of production (i.e., energy, land,
labor, etc.), infrastructure or access to particular facilities, and local policy (Van Dijk &
Pellenbarg, 2000).

Given our interest in explaining aggregate local transience, the

present study focuses on external migration factors.
In terms of the rationale used to explain firm migration, relocation theory can be
divided into three different schools of thought: neo-classical, behavioral, and institutional
approaches (see Hayter, 1997, and Pellenbarg et al., 2002, for recent reviews of the
relocation literature). Neo-classical relocation theory assumes perfect information and
rational economic agents that seek to maximize profits (or minimize costs). Location
matters because costs and revenues vary over space producing different spatial margins
to profitability in different locations. Also, due to internal and external changes, the
margins to profitability offered by different locations vary over time. Economic agents
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are able to continuously estimate the different geographical margins to profitability and to
identify their optimal location at each point in time. However, due to relocation costs and
capital inertia (i.e., sunk costs) the firm will not be able to continuously move to the new
‘optimal’ location. If potential gains from relocating into a new locale offset relocation
costs the firm may move to another area. Although both internal (i.e., firm growth) and
external factors are key drivers of migration in this framework, neo-classical location
research has traditionally focused on external migration factors (Pellenbarg et al., 2002)2.
Behavioral relocation theory, which is based on the behavioral theory of the firm
(Simon; 1955; Cyert & March, 1963), focuses on the decision-making process and seeks
a better understanding of the actual behavior of the entrepreneur (e.g., Brouwer et al.,
2004). It replaces the assumption of fully informed economic agents making optimal
decisions with the view of a bounded rational decision-maker that works with limited
(and possibly biased) information emanating from the firm’s own searching, informationprocessing and learning activities. Thus, uncertainty (i.e., lack of information) and
perception (which may deviate from reality) is what matters to explain firm migration
decisions in this tradition (Pellenbarg et al., 2002). Also, firms evaluate their location
only occasionally. For example, in Nakosteen & Zimmer (1987) model, firms monitor
their profits relative to a fixed target threshold and do not engage in a search for
alternative locations as long as this target is met. Moreover, alternatives are searched and
evaluated in a sequential way; and decision-makers are satisficers (as opposed to
optimizers), so that they will often settle for the first alternative that is found to exceed
the firm’s performance aspiration level (Van Dijk & Pellenbarg, 2000). Given its main
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Recent developments in neo-classical location theory include the new economic geography writings of
Krugman (1995).
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precepts, the emphasis of the behavioral approach is on internal mobility factors, like
firm specific characteristics (i.e., firm age, size, industry, growth) (e.g., Van Dijk &
Pellenbarg, 2000; Brouwer et al., 2004), as well as indicators of the firm’s willingness
and ability to obtain and process information (e.g., organizational structure, the quality of
management, and organizational goals) (e.g., Lloyd & Dicken, 1992).
Given their relative emphasis on external and internal relocation factors,
Pellenbarg et al. (2002) recommends “an eclectic combination of the behavioural and
neo-classical approaches” (p. 116). In the next section, we follow this recommendation
to derive our hypotheses.
Finally, institutional location theory posits that firms exert substantial influence
upon their environment (Hayter, 1997; Martin, 2000). According to this theory, location
decisions are the outcome of a firm’s negotiation with distributors, suppliers,
government, labor unions and other institutions about prices, wages, tax subsidies,
infrastructure, and other key production factors. Given this, it has been argued that
institutional theory is more suitable for the study of large enterprise expansion and
migration (Pellenbarg et al., 2002). Larger firms have more bargaining power, while
small firms usually have to accept conditions as dictated to them. Hence, this theoretical
perspective is less pertinent in the context of the present study.

HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Prior entrepreneurship literature suggests several groups of environmental factors
that affect firm births and deaths within a region, including economic conditions, industry
structure, demographic indicators, labor market characteristics, availability of financial as
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well as non-financial assistance, and network and ecological considerations (e.g.,
Armington & Acs, 2002; Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994; Reynolds, 1994). Many of these
variables may also relate to entrepreneurial transience. While we intend to account for
these environmental factors in our empirical analyses, the primary focus of our
investigation is on policy variables subject to manipulation by local governments. Given
similarities in market variables and costs of inputs across neighboring locations, we
expect policy differences to be salient and to play a significant role in firms’ decision to
relocate as well as in their choice of a new location (Keeble, 1976; Pellenbarg, 2005). In
this regard, local policies may be conceived as ‘anchoring strategies’ (Lagendijk, 1999),
which seek to achieve positive rather than negative net transience or, in other words,
migration surplus as opposed to migration deficit (Mariotti & Pen, 2002).
Chief among policy instruments that can be used to attract and retain businesses is
manipulation of the local tax system (Wasylenko, 1997) which includes tax rates as well
as special tax abatements and incentive programs.

Local Taxes and Entrepreneurial Transience
In the United States several kinds of tax vehicles are administered locally. Most
counties, municipalities, and school districts (in some cases after tax-payer approval) levy
taxes on real property located in their jurisdictions, including land and buildings used for
industrial/commercial purposes. Some states also allow local governments to levy taxes
on income earned (including firm profits) and/or on sales of goods and services (normally
to end-users) in the locale. We are interested in the effects of each of these forms of local
taxation on net transience of local entrepreneurial populations. As reported below, local
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tax rates vary significantly across neighboring locations which raises the possibility of
relocation rents. Also, taxes and tax-related issues are among the most acute concerns of
small business owners (Phillips & Wade, 2008) who, therefore, are likely to be very
sensitive to these regional tax differentials.
Our argument is straightforward: Lowering tax rates below region-average levels
is likely to stimulate migration surplus within the locale. Consistent with neo-classical
reasoning, less fiscal pressure increases the location’s margin to profitability which, in
turn, should increase net transience.

Property tax. Property taxes are the main source of local tax revenue in the
United States and, in particular, play a key role in the funding of the education system. In
2004, over 54,000 local property-tax-levying jurisdictions across the U.S. (including
counties, cities, school districts, community college districts, fire districts, sewer districts,
etc.) collected an estimated $308 billion in property taxes (Prante, 2006). As a result,
property taxes are often the biggest local tax burden on small businesses.
Property taxes are seen as a disincentive to entrepreneurial activity because they
create an added fixed cost of business, which is due whether the firm makes a profit or
not (Wagner & Sternberg, 2004). The scant research evidence available appears to
support this conjecture: First, with regard to new firm formation, Bartik (1989) found
average business property tax rates to be negatively related to state-level business starts.
Also, with regard to firm migration, Wasylenko (1980) found lower local property taxes
to explain firm in-migration patterns from Milwaukee central city to its suburban
markets, at least for some industries (manufacturing and wholesale) and some markets
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(those that did not overly restrict industrial and commercial land use). Finally, Carlsen,
Langset & Rattso (2005) found that municipalities in Norway with more geographically
mobile firm populations (i.e., populations that had a greater ability to flee, based on their
industry composition) tended to set lower comparative fees for infrastructure use by
firms. This is the only local tax instrument in that institutional context, and it is similar to
property taxes in the sense that it also represents a fixed cost to business. Their findings
suggest that local governments use this form of taxation as an important business
retention tool.
Consistent with neo-classical relocation theory arguments, as well as with the
limited available evidence, we expect that firms will move out of counties with higher
property tax rates while relocating firms will be attracted to counties with comparatively
lower property tax rates. Stated formally:

Hypothesis

1:

Net

entrepreneurial

transience

is

negatively

related

to

the

industrial/commercial property tax rate in an area.

Local income tax. Local income taxes are a less pervasive policy instrument
throughout the United States, although recent data suggests that it has become quite
common: Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are
states with widespread use of local income taxes (Henchman, 2008). A few counties,
cities, and/or school districts also impose income taxes in Alabama, Arkansas, California,
Delaware, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon (Henchman, 2008).
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There is a copious literature on the effects of income taxes on entrepreneurial
activity.

However, prior work has largely focused on national (e.g., Davidsson &

Henrekson, 2002) and, to a lesser extent, state-level (Georgellis & Wall, 2006; Bruce,
Deskins, & Mohsin, 2004) income taxation; and on its effects on either start-up rates or
total entrepreneurial capital (often defined as rates of self-employment). Theory and
findings emanating from this literature suggest that local income taxes will provide a
revenue vehicle with rather benign consequences for new venture formation. First, as
opposed to property taxes, income taxes involve risk sharing with local ventures (Domar
& Musgrave, 1944): The local government collects less revenue if ventures are not
successful; and the latter pay no tax unless they make a profit. Second, because local tax
schemes are typically based on a flat rate (i.e., they are not progressive), this form of
taxation does not disproportionately penalize those who succeed, thus encouraging
greater entrepreneurial effort (Gentry & Hubbard, 2000).

Finally, income taxation

encourages entrepreneurial activity due to the opportunity to under-report income, and
thus to evade taxes, under self-employment (Pestieau & Possen, 1991, 1992). Of course,
the added consideration at the local level is that variation in tax schemes across
neighboring jurisdictions provides opportunities to capture tax advantages via relocation.
Thus, after formation, a high local income tax rate may provide incentives for native
ventures to migrate to a more tax advantageous area.
Based on a straightforward neo-classical argument, as income taxes reduce net
profits, we expect higher local income tax rates to lead to greater out-migration and lesser
in-migration rates. Stated formally:
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Hypothesis 2: Net entrepreneurial transience is negatively related to the local income tax
rate in an area.

Local sales tax. This is another common policy instrument at the local level.
Counties, cities or other jurisdictions levy sales tax rates that are added to the state tax
rate and collected on applicable business transactions. There are 30 states that allow local
sales taxes across the U.S. In 1999, sales taxes produced $35 billion for localities in
these states (Dennis, 2002).
A high sales tax rate may limit the growth potential of a firm by making its goods
and services less affordable to potential customers (Chen & Williams, 1999).
Accordingly, since business growth is one of the leading reasons for firm relocation, a
county with above-average sales tax rates may be a less attractive destination, ceteris
paribus, than a locale with below average rates. Fewer opportunities for business growth
may also limit the pursuit of economies of scale, resulting in higher costs. Additionally,
from a behavioral standpoint, to the extent that greater sales tax rates impact firm
revenues, native firms in a high sales tax context are more likely to initiate a problemistic
search (Cyert & March, 1963) for a new location. Therefore, locales with high sales tax
rates are likely to experience net migration deficits while locales with low sales tax are
likely to experience migration surpluses. Stated formally:

Hypothesis 3: Net entrepreneurial transience is negatively related to the sales tax rate in
an area.
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Moderating effect of income
Prior research suggests that drivers of entrepreneurial activity differ depending on
a region’s relative wealth. For example, beyond experiencing greater rates of new firm
formation, the types of activities undertaken by entrepreneurs in wealthy locations differ
significantly from entrepreneurial opportunities in low-income areas (Wennekers, van
Stel, Thurik, & Reynolds, 2005).

Research also suggests that necessity-based

entrepreneurship is more common in low-income regions while opportunity
entrepreneurs are more prevalent in high-income locations (Acs, Arenius, Hay, &
Minniti, 2005). Necessity-based entrepreneurship involves people who start a business
because other employment options are either absent or unsatisfactory (Reynolds et al,
2002). Buy contrast, opportunity-based entrepreneurship includes individuals that
respond to entrepreneurial opportunities. Globally, about one-third of entrepreneurs
indicate they act out of necessity, although there is substantial variation across countries
in these proportions (Reynolds et al., 2005).
We expect that low-income counties will be characterized by a greater share of
necessity-based entrepreneurs and, as a result, that their venture populations will exhibit
less geographic mobility. Behavioral relocation theory suggests that necessity-based
entrepreneurs may have a lesser ability to relocate.

First, as a reaction to local

unemployment, necessity-based entrepreneurship suggests a commitment to the area on
the part of the entrepreneur and, thus, an unwillingness to search for work elsewhere.
Second, necessity-based entrepreneurship is often associated with lower education levels
(Reynolds et al, 2002), which in turn may be related to a less effective use of relevant
information about geographical margins to profitability and, thus, to a greater likelihood
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of lingering in a suboptimal location (Pellenbarg et al., 2002). Third, necessity-based
entrepreneurs might have lower thresholds of acceptable performance, and may be more
undercapitalized and resource constrained as well, and thus may be more willing to
remain in a spatially unfavorable location rather than face relocation expenditures. Given
this, we expect that the effects of taxation on net transience will be more tenuous in lowincome locales.
By contrast, opportunity-based entrepreneurs may have greater performance
thresholds, as well as better ability to collect and act upon information regarding spatially
available margins to profitability. As a result, we expect opportunity-driven
entrepreneurs’ behavior to be closer to that of the neo-classical profit maximizer: They
will exhibit a greater proclivity to relocate in order to tap greater margins available
elsewhere. Given this, locales with a greater share of opportunity-based entrepreneurship
(i.e., high-income counties) may demonstrate a stronger relationship between local
taxation and net entrepreneurial transience. Stated formally:

Hypothesis 4a: Average personal income in an area moderates the negative relationship
between property tax rates and net entrepreneurial transience such that the relationship is
stronger in high-income counties than in low-income counties.

Hypothesis 4b: Average personal income in an area moderates the negative relationship
between local income tax rates and net entrepreneurial transience such that the
relationship is stronger in high-income counties than in low-income counties.
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Hypothesis 4c: Average personal income in an area moderates the negative relationship
between sales tax rates and net entrepreneurial transience such that the relationship is
stronger in high-income counties than in low-income counties.

Local Tax Incentives: Enterprise Zones
Enterprise zones (EZs) are a relatively new policy instrument that originated in
Britain and was first introduced in the United States during the 1980’s. By 1987 more
than 30 states had EZ programs (Couch, Atkinson, & Smith, 2005). Once an area has
been designated as an EZ, tax incentives are made available to firms that locate within the
geographic confines of the zone.
We expect that EZs will have an impact on intra-regional migration rates. First,
based on a straightforward neo-classical rationale, firms receiving/expecting to receive
subsidies will be enticed to remain in/move to the EZ location, which as a result of tax
subsidies will exhibit comparatively favorable spatial margins to profitability (Pellenbarg
et al, 2002). More importantly, from a behavioral perspective, the presence of EZs may
act as a signal of an interest in enterprise development on the part of the local government
and, thus, of a supporting climate for relocating ventures. Hence, for smaller ventures,
which have a lesser ability to negotiate subsidies with the local government, and which
face greater information constraints, the presence of active EZs may help create the
perception of a favorable business environment. Stated formally:

Hypothesis 5: Net entrepreneurial transience is positively related to the prevalence of
enterprise zones in an area.
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METHODS
Data
The population for the present study consists of the 88 counties in the state of
Ohio. We collected data for each county and for each year between 2000 and 2004. Our
independent variables were lagged by one year, so that the effective data used consists of
a panel dataset of 352 county-year observations containing 2001 to 2004 transience
estimates and 2000 to 2003 data on independent variables. Data was drawn from a
number of secondary sources including Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation, Ohio
Department of Development and Ohio Department of Taxation, as well as the Bureau of
the Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Small Business Administration, and Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Measures
Dependent Variable: Net Transience. Information for this variable was drawn
from the Ohio Bureau of Workers Compensation (BWC) data files. Ohio employers
(even part-time employers) are required to carry worker’s compensation insurance.
Large and financially stable employers are allowed to self-insure. All other employers
must purchase and maintain a policy with the BWC by paying bi-annual premiums based
on self-reported payroll in several employment categories or “manual codes”. Given this
legal requirement, the BWC database is believed to be a reliable source of employer
counts in Ohio3.

3

County-level business counts obtained from BWC as part of this study were found to be comparable to
county-level data on number of establishments from the Census Bureau.
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BWC data, however, includes more than just private business employers. Some
state and county public employers contribute to the state insurance fund as well. In
addition, private not-for-profit employers are also required to maintain active accounts
with BWC. This includes schools, colleges, universities, and related activities (e.g.,
fraternities and sororities); emergency services; welfare and social services; religious
organizations; athletic clubs and events; and even persons hiring uninsured domestic
contractors and household employees. Therefore it was important to screen BWC
accounts and select only those that corresponded to private businesses, as indicated by
insurance manual codes. County-level aggregates of BWC policies corresponding to
non-public for-profit employers were provided by the Office of Strategic Research of the
Ohio Department of Development.
BWC data files include information on (i) active policies and the year they were
started; (ii) cancelled policies and the year they were cancelled, when companies are
dissolved or move out of state; and (iii) policies that become inactive due to firm
bankruptcy. Interestingly, if a company moves within the state of Ohio its policy remains
unchanged and active, and only the firm address is updated. Given the structure of BWC
data, net transience for a particular county (i) in a particular year (t) was measured as the
relative change in the number of active businesses that could not be explained either by
new policies, cancelled policies, or firm bankruptcies during the year. Formally:
Net Transience i (t) 

[Actives i (t) - Actives i (t - 1)] - [New i (t) - Cancelled i (t) - Bankrupt i (t)]
 100
Actives i (t)

This measure estimates the percent change in the number of local businesses due
to firm relocations to/from other counties. Positive net transience values indicate that a
greater contingent of businesses moved into the county than out of the county. Negative
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values indicate a grater number of relocations out of the county. Average net transience
was -0.24% (stdev =2.46).
Tax Rates. Local governments in Ohio are authorized to impose taxes on
property, income, and sales. Tax data was obtained from Ohio Department of Taxation.
Property Tax Rates. In Ohio, as well as in most other states, assessment and
collection of property tax bills is handled at the county level, with revenue subsequently
distributed to each taxing jurisdiction according to the taxable values and tax rates levied
by each. Our measure was the average effective property tax rate for commercial,
industrial, mineral, and public utility class of real property, computed as aggregated
county-wide taxes divided by county-wide taxable business property values in each
particular tax year4. Average property tax rates are expressed in mills (i.e., units of $1 per
$1,000 of taxable value) and include levies by all jurisdictions (school district, county,
municipality, etc.) for property located in each county. Rates varied considerably, from
31.8 to 70.9 mills (μ=48.45; stdev =7.56).
Local Income Tax Rates. Ohio municipalities have the ability to levy a flat rate
tax imposed on wages and salaries earned by residents as well as by non-residents
working in the municipality, and on net business profits attributable to activities in the
municipality. To create our county-level measure, local income tax rates were averaged
across all cities and villages within a county for each year observation. Rates ranged
from zero to 1.81 percent (μ=0.25; stdev =0.24).
Local Sales Tax Rates. Ohio counties (as well as a few transit authorities) are
authorized to levy a sales tax in addition to the state sales tax (of 5.5 percent from 2000 to

4

In Ohio, taxable value is 35 percent of the true (market) value, as assessed by the county auditor every
three years.
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2002, and temporarily increased to 6.0 percent in 2003), subject to voter approval. Since
1987, local sales tax can be levied in quarter-percent increments up to a 1.5 percent rate.
Since this is a county-level tax, our variable was straightforward. County sales tax rates
ranged from zero to 1.50 percent (μ=1.11; stdev =0.32).
Enterprise Zones. Since 1982, local governments in OH have the ability to offer
tax incentives to encourage new business capital investment through the creation of an
Enterprise Zone (EZ). The latter is a designated area in which businesses can receive
exemptions from real or personal property taxes up to 75% for up to 10 years on new
capital investments (buildings or building renovations, machinery/equipment, and
furniture or inventory improvements). The municipal government must define the
geographic area in need of business development and then submit a petition and gain EZ
certification from the state. Once certification is granted, municipalities are permitted to
negotiate tax incentive agreements (i.e., contracts) with prospective companies. Our
measure is the average prevalence of EZs, computed as the total number of active EZs in
the county-year divided by the number of municipalities in the county (μ=0.11; stdev
=0.08).
Control Variables. We controlled for a number of potential correlates of net
transience. First, to account for general entrepreneurial climate, we controlled for local
rates of new firm formation. Firm birth rates were computed as the ratio of new business
starts in the county-year per 100 people (e.g., Lee, Florida, & Acs, 2004; Reynolds,
Storey & Westhead, 1994). Second, we controlled for the structure of industry in the
focal county-year, as this may affect rational incentives to exit/enter. Following
Armington and Acs (2002) and Lee et al. (2004), we used industry intensity and average

21

establishment size as proxies for local industry structure. The former was measured as
the number of establishments per 100 people. The later was measured as total
employment divided by the number of establishments, using County Business Patterns
data from the Bureau of the Census. Third, we added indicators of local demand growth,
including per capita annual income growth and population growth (Reynolds, 1994).
County-year personal income data was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Population estimates were obtained from the Census Bureau. Per capita income amounts
were adjusted for inflation using the GDP implicit price deflator and were nominated in $
thousands of 2004. Fourth, we controlled for local labor market conditions, including the
change in unemployment rate, as well as the share of high-school dropouts and the share
of college graduates (e.g., Lee et al., 2004). The change in unemployment rate proxies
for trends in local labor costs. Also, depending on the industry and type of business,
firms may relocate to tap onto local pools of either low-skilled or high-skilled
employees5. The share of high-school dropouts has been used in the prior literature as a
proxy for the prevalence of unskilled and semi-skilled labor (e.g., Armington & Acs,
2002), while the percent of college graduates proxies for the availability of high-skilled
labor. County-level unemployment data was obtained from the Ohio Department of Job
and Family Services. Education attainment data was obtained from the Bureau of the
Census. The share of high-school dropouts was defined as the percent of the countyyear’s adult population (those over 25 years of age) without a high school degree. The
share of college graduates was the percent of the adult population with a bachelor’s
degree or above. Fifth, we added controls for the extent to which the locale may facilitate
access to institutional capital. In contrast to prior studies of new firm formation which
5

We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this to us.
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emphasize local personal wealth as a predictor (e.g., Gnyawali & Fogel, 1994; Pennings,
1982; Shane, 1996; Sutaria & Hicks, 2004), our focus here was rather on the extent to
which a locale may offer greater/lesser access to commercial lending, as the phenomenon
of interest is the relocation of firms that have been operational for some time and, thus,
are beyond their founding stages. Prior research suggests that firms depend on informal
borrowing from family members, friends, and angel investors during their early years
(Brophy, 1997), but that bank credit becomes the largest incremental source of funding
after that (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). We used two separate measures to proxy for
conditions leading to greater bank-credit access: (i) the natural log of Small Business
Administration loan guarantees (in $ millions) in the county-year, per capita; and (ii) the
level of competition among financial institutions, as measured by the number of bank
offices per capita. Given the dependence of small and young firms on so-called
“relationship” lending6 (Ang, 1992), branch proliferation was believed to be the most
salient aspect of local bank competition for the purposes of the present study. Sixth, we
controlled for per-capita personal income level, adjusted for inflation. This was
important as other regressors (in particular income-tax rates, but also education as well as
the density of bank offices) might be related to income. Addition of this variable was also
necessary in our full model specification, to be able to explore hypothesized moderation
of tax effects. Finally, as discussed below, we controlled for random county-effects as

6

“Relationship” lending refers to lending based on “soft” information that results from direct relationships
between the loan officer and the small business owner, its firm, and its community. It is opposed to
“transaction-based” lending, which is based on “hard” information about the business contained on formal
financial statements, tangible assets than can be offered as collateral, or information from external credit
bureaus (Berger and Udell, 2002). Proximity between the small firm and the lender is essential to
relationship lending (e.g., Petersen & Rajan, 2002).
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well, which capture any additional impacts on net transience from county traits beyond
those explicitly included in the regression equation.
Statistical Analysis. We test our hypotheses by means of random-effects
generalized least squares regression of net transience rate. The random county effect
accounts for unobserved time-invariant characteristics of counties that may bear on
transience. To the extent that relevant omitted variables are correlated with explanatory
variables included in our model, the failure to account for these correlations would bias
the regression estimates (Hsiao, 1986). Furthermore, given the panel structure of the
data, we base our results on robust estimation of standard errors, in order to avoid bias
due to potential autocorrelation.
All regressors (both controls and independent variables of interest) were lagged
by 1 year to better proxy for information that was available to small business owners at
the time of their decision to relocate.
Since some of our hypotheses entail moderation, we used a hierarchical sequence
of models. The baseline model (Model 1) contains only control variables. A subsequent
model (Model 2) contains controls as well as the main effects of the policy variables of
interest. This model provides tests for Hypotheses 1 to 3, as well as Hypothesis 5. The
final full model (Model 3) includes also the interaction effects between tax terms and percapita income and, thus, provides a test for Hypotheses 4a to 4c. We assessed overall
model fit by means of Wald chi-square statistics. We used chi-square difference tests to
assess the incremental contribution of each subsequent block of variables.

RESULTS
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Descriptive statistics and correlations are given in Table 1. Results of hypotheses
testing are summarized in Table 2.
----------------------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------------------------------ Insert Table 2 about here -------------------------Overall, the set of control variables in our base-line model (Model 1, in Table 2)
is strongly significant [X2 (12) =151.5; p< 0.001]. Net transience tends to be positive and
larger in counties that (i) provide a favorable environment for entrepreneurial firms (as
indicated by firm birth rates), (ii) exhibit lower intensity of businesses per capita, and (iii)
have faster growing populations.
Adding the block of policy variables in Model 2 resulted in a marginally
significant increase in overall model fit [X2 (4) =8.1; p< 0.087]. The estimated
coefficients for property tax rate and sales tax rate are against the expected direction, in
both cases, and are non-significant, so that Hypotheses 1 and 3 are not supported. The
coefficient for average income tax is negative and significant (β=–1.20; p=.016). This
result provides support for Hypothesis 2 and suggests that lessening income taxes will
enhance the ability of a locale to attract ventures currently operating elsewhere. The
coefficient for EZs is positive, as predicted, but fails to reach statistical significance.
Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
Extension of the regression equation with interaction effects between tax variables
and income (Model 3, in Table 2) resulted in a strong improvement in model fit. The Chisquare difference test between Model 2 and Model 3 suggests that the set of interaction
terms is jointly significant [X2 (3) =34.2; p< 0.001]. With regard to individual effects, the
coefficient for the interaction between property tax rate and personal income is negative
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and significant (β= –0.01; p=.023), indicating that the slope of the relationship between
property taxes and net transience declines as average income increases. This result
provides support for Hypothesis 4a. Further analysis of the shape of this interaction term
(see Figure 1 for a plot of this interaction effect) demonstrates that the effect of property
taxes on transience reverses over the mid-range of the distribution of personal income
values. In high income counties (we plot the relationship at one standard deviation above
the mean) greater property taxes lead to lesser net transience, as predicted. However, in
low income counties (we plot at one standard deviation below the mean) greater property
taxes were actually found to lead to greater net transience. Thus, although we did find a
negative moderation effect of income, the particular shape of the interaction effect was a
bit of a surprise and explains why we failed to find support for an overall negative main
effect of property taxes in Model 2 above.
----------------------- Insert Figure 1 about here -------------------------The regression coefficient for the interaction between income tax rate and per
capita personal income is in the hypothesized direction but is not statistically significant.
Thus, Hypothesis 4b is not supported. Income levels do not moderate the negative effect
of local income tax rates on net transience.
The coefficient for the interaction between sales tax rate and personal income is
positive and non-significant. Thus, Hypothesis 4c is not supported. Net transience is
unaffected by local sales tax rates.
Interestingly, allowing for interaction terms in the regression specification
revealed marginal positive effects on transience of local labor market structure (both
prevalence of low-skilled and of high-skilled labor), as well as of personal income. The

26

latter effect is also reflected in the interaction plot shown in Figure 1, as expected levels
of transience over the mid-range of property tax values (minus/plus 1 standard deviation
from the mean) are consistently lower in low-income counties (i.e., estimated net
transience lines do not cross).

DISCUSSION
This study introduces a novel topic for the entrepreneurship literature, which we
term entrepreneurial transience. While the extant literature has focused on the study of
firm births and deaths (e.g., Reynolds et al., 1995), we argue that venture relocation is
also an important phenomenon that contributes to the accumulation of entrepreneurial
capital in a region and, as such, should be of interest to policy makers as well as to
entrepreneurship researchers and practitioners. We explore possible reasons that may
justify a costly decision for a firm to migrate into another location, propose hypotheses
regarding the impact of local tax policies on net rates of entrepreneurial transience, argue
for other possible environmental determinants, and investigate relationships using
county-level data for the state of Ohio during the 2000-2004 period.
Our findings demonstrate that local authorities possess several tools to stimulate
the net gain of transient businesses into the area. First, local (i.e., municipal) income tax
rates were found to be negatively related to net transience. This provides support for neoclassical relocation theories based on relative spatial margins to profitability, and
suggests that cities could reduce income taxes as a means of attracting outside ventures.
Second, property tax rates were also found to be related to net transience, although the
direction of the relationship depended on average personal income level in the county.
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This finding was somewhat of a surprise. Based on behavioral relocation theory, we had
hypothesized moderation (in strength, but not in sign) by county income levels. In lieu of
that, we found income moderation of a stronger form, whereby tax effects flipped their
signs in poorer versus richer counties. The expected negative effect of property tax rates
on venture transience was circumscribed to high-income counties. The effect was
reversed in low-income areas. The implication is that local governments may want to
follow a contingency approach to property tax policy, depending on average personal
income in their area.
While tax rates were found to be important determinants of entrepreneurial
transience, we found no support for a similar role of tax incentive schemes. In particular,
the relative prevalence of EZs within a county was not related to net venture relocation
rates. An ex-post perusal of enterprise zone agreements entered during the period of
study across a sample of Ohio counties suggests that this policy tool tends to target larger,
more mature firms (both from state and out-of-state) that can bring substantial investment
and employment gains to the area. Thus, EZs may do more to promote mature
businesses’ expansion into the county as opposed to re-location by smaller/younger
ventures. Furthermore, to the extent that some enterprise zone agreements involve intrastate relocations of smaller firms, the inflow of external businesses receiving preferential
tax treatment in the locale may be matched by an outflow of incumbents who now find
themselves at a disadvantage. In short, it could be that special tax abatement and
incentive agreements have positive effects on both venture in-migration and outmigration to/from a focal county, so that they become a blunt entrepreneurial activity
instrument. Indeed, although the literature on economic impact of EZs is rather mixed,
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our results are consistent with the majority of studies, which have found little or no effect
of zones on either local levels of economic activity (e.g., Boarnet & Bogart, 1996) or
employment outcomes (e.g., Bondonio & Engberg, 2000). Given this, Greenbaum and
Engberg (2004) called for the separate study of job (or establishment) creation and
destruction flows, as opposed to net changes. Their research shows that EZs have a
positive effect on new establishment outcomes but a negative effect on existing
establishment outcomes, resulting in overall neutral effects on both employment and
number of establishments. In a similar fashion, future research should seek to cast further
light onto transience outcomes that derive from enterprise zone and other tax incentives
by studying their separate impact on venture migration inflows and outflows.
Although our focus was on policy strategies, the study also sheds light on
environmental determinants of net transience. Transient ventures were found to favor
counties with greater rates of population growth, greater per capita income, greater
proportions of low-skilled and high-skilled adults, lesser industry intensity (i.e., lesser
competition), and greater rates of new firm creation. The latter is, perhaps, most
interesting. We argued that greater start-up rates proxy for a supportive entrepreneurial
climate or culture in the focal county. Additionally, for some of the relocating ventures
(specially those specializing in business services), it may be that greater start-up rates
provide greater business opportunities. In either case, it would seem that the benefits of a
vigorous entrepreneurial community spill over into net transience, thus compiling the
accumulation of entrepreneurial capital in the locale. Hence, our findings underscore the
importance of policies that seek to find a balance between providing a favorable
environment for established ventures and stimulating local start-up activity.
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Implications for Research
There are several implications for research that derive form our study. First, our
paper contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by raising the topic of business
transience as an important aspect of entrepreneurial activity and as a contributor to the
accumulation of entrepreneurial capital within a region, alongside net rates of business
creation (firm births minus deaths). Further research is needed that explores determinants
and consequences of entrepreneurial transience, as well as its interplay with native firm
creation.
Second, our study contributes to the firm relocation literature in industrial
demography. Prior findings in this literature (mainly based on European data) provide
evidence of a limited impact of regional economic conditions on firm migration rates
(Benoit, 1995), as well as mixed findings, at best, for the role of government policy
(Pellenbarg et al., 2002). Here we found, strong evidence of both. Also, as far as the role
of government is concerned prior firm relocation literature has focused on infrastructure,
land zoning regulations, environmental regulations, and tax subsidies, as opposed to local
taxation, which doesn’t exist in European countries. Here we find that local tax rates are
an important firm migration policy tool.
Third, our study contributes to the literature on taxation and entrepreneurial
activity. Most of the prior research has focused on the effects of federal and state
personal and corporate income taxes. Thus, authors have called for attention to local tax
policies, and to other forms of taxation besides income taxes, which may represent the
bulk of the tax burden for small firms (e.g., Bruce, Deskins, & Mohsin, 2004). Our
research answers this call and studies the effects of local property, income, and sales
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taxation on a key element of entrepreneurial population dynamics: entrepreneurial
transience. Future research should also investigate the consequences of local taxation on
local rates of new firm formation, to ascertain that national and state-level findings can be
translated to the local level.
Fourth, our study suggests that the effects of income taxes on entrepreneurial
activity are more complex than previously thought. Prior studies report either a linear
positive (e.g., Bruce & Mohsin, 2006; Evans & Leighton, 1989) or U-shaped (Georgellis
& Wall, 2006) relationship between (federal and state) income tax rates and new firm
formation. Authors argue that greater tax rates provide incentives to self-employment in
the form of greater opportunities for tax evasion and greater net subsidies to risk taking
by emerging start-ups (e.g., Cullen & Gordon, 2007; Parker, 1996; Pestieau & Possen
1991, 1992). By contrast, the present study finds the relationship of (local) income taxes
with net transience to be linear and negative7. Since relocating entrepreneurs are past the
point of considering alternatives to self-employment, the reduction in profits associated
with higher income tax rates becomes the most salient aspect to them. Given
countervailing effects on start-ups and migration, the net impact of local income tax
policies on accumulation of entrepreneurial capital is ambiguous and begs future study.
Fifth, our study also extends the scant prior evidence regarding effects of business
property tax rates on entrepreneurial activity. Bartik (1989) found property tax rates to
be negatively related to business starts, and Wasylenko (1980) found them to be
negatively related to firm in-migration in manufacturing and wholesale industries, where
demand does not vary by location. Similarly, we found property tax rates to be negatively

7

Although not reported, we ran models with quadratic taxation terms which failed to reach statistical
significance in all cases.
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related to net transience, although this was circumscribed to high-income counties only.
In low-income counties, our study suggests that business property tax rates are, actually,
positively related to net transience. As noted above, we expect low-income counties to
be characterized by a greater share of necessity-based entrepreneurs, which are often
associated with marginally profitable businesses. Given this, a tentative explanation for
our finding might be that, in low-income counties, increases in property taxes may lead to
increases in business termination rates, which in turn would lead to increases in the stock
of commercial property available for sale and downward pressure on property prices.
These favorable factor conditions may, then, attract outside ventures, with healthier
business models, to relocate into the county. Future research is needed that sheds further
light on the impact of property tax on venture formation and transience across regional
income levels, and to explore the underlying mechanisms of any observed effects. In
particular, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of business property taxes on
business exit (i.e., termination), as well as on venture in-migration and out-migration
flows.
Implications for Policy and Practice
Our study has important policy implications. First, it calls for restoring
considerations of entrepreneurial migration as part of the economic development puzzle
at the local level. Since most firm relocations are local, prior regional and national level
studies failed to find that firm populations were strongly influenced by migration. This
led to a prevalent approach to business development that focuses on firm creation and
closure, while ignoring transience concerns (Pellenbarg, 2005). Findings from the present
study show that such a streamlined policy-making approach may not be appropriate at the
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county (or municipality) level. Maximization of local entrepreneurial capital calls for a
consideration of the complex interplay between all demographic events in business
populations: births, deaths, and migration. Second, in terms of specific policy
instruments, our study suggests that property taxes are an important economic
development tool, but their role depends on local income levels. In affluent locales,
property tax policy directed to the promotion of entrepreneurial capital appears
straightforward: Lower business property taxes should increase both start-up rates as well
as net transience. By contrast, in low income locales, the overall effect of property tax
policy on entrepreneurial activity is less clear: Lower property tax rates may increase
birth rates at the expense of a decrease in net venture migration rates. Interestingly, our
results suggest that local income taxes may involve a similar trade-off between native
venture formation and net transience: Higher (lower) income taxes may be used to
increase (decrease) local start-up rates in exchange for venture migration deficits
(surpluses). These trade-offs underscore the dangers of a development approach overly
focused on new firm formation. For example, locales with high income tax rates may
foster local start-ups but may not fully reap the associated economic benefits, as
successful local ventures are more likely to leave. This raises the prospect that
neighboring communities will become the eventual beneficiaries of native
entrepreneurship.
Our study also has implications for entrepreneurs. First, relocation is one of the
strategic options available to entrepreneurs to improve the likelihood of venture survival
and growth. Hence, by informing of environmental and policy drivers of net migration,
this research points to aspects that should be considered as part of the decision to move
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and selection of a new location. Second, from the point of view of young ventures in the
host region, our study may point to predictors of greater future levels of competition:
Since migrating firms are older and will tend to be somewhat larger as well than the
typical startup, relocation of outside ventures into a region may result in non-trivial
increases in the level of competition for market space and for resources. Future research
may explore this further by analyzing the effects of venture in-migration on subsequent
failure rates and out-migration.
Limitations
Results from the present research have to be considered in the context of certain
limitations. While consistent with current approaches to the study of entrepreneurship
(e.g.; Santarelli & Piergiovanni, 1995) our data is limited to firms with at least one
employee. Our study is also limited to intra-state venture transience, as venture relocation
from out-of-state would not be included in our measure of net transience. Nevertheless,
we expect the former to represent the bulk of the phenomenon of interest. Since we study
transience at the county-level of analysis, a greater limitation is that we don’t capture
intra-county firm migration. Also, our investigation is limited to effects on net transience
surpluses/deficits. Although this is appropriate for an initial study of this phenomenon,
and it conforms to a similar approach used in the study of firm formation (AnyadikeDanes, Hart, & O'Reilly, 2005), we have acknowledged throughout this discussion that
subsequent research analyzing migration inflows and outflows separately will contribute
to a better understanding of the etiology and dynamics of entrepreneurial transience.
Finally, our finding regarding a moderating effect by county income levels has to be
interpreted with caution as this result could be due to different composition of industry

34

sectors in low- versus high-income areas. We leave exploration of this issue to future
research.

CONCLUSION
We argue that net transience is a contributing factor to the accumulation of
entrepreneurial ventures in a locale and, as such, deserves attention from researchers,
policy makers and practitioners. The focus of the prior entrepreneurship literature has
been on venture birth and death rates (e.g., Anyadike-Danes et al., 2005; Reynolds et al.,
1995). However, because venture populations are transient, attraction and retention rates
also have an impact on changes in the local stock of ventures and, thus, on expected
economic development benefits.

This paper brings attention to the phenomenon of

entrepreneurial transience and sheds light on its policy and environmental drivers. We
show that local taxation is an important predictor of firm relocation rates.
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TABLE 1
a
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Mean

S.D.

1

. Net transience
-0.24
. Property tax rate
48.45
. Income tax rate
0.25
. Sales tax rate
1.11
. Enterprise-Zone programs
0.11
. Firm-birth rate
0.22
. Industry intensity
1.99
. Establishment size
15.44
. Per capita income growth
0.01
. Population growth
0.29
. Change in unemployment rate
0.09
. Share of high school dropout
0.19
. Share of college graduates
0.15
. Ln(SBA loan guarantees per capita)b 2.72
. Bank offices per capita
0.36
. Per capita personal incomec
26.78

2.46
7.56
0.24
0.32
0.08
0.06
0.36
3.74
0.02
1.49
0.17
0.05
0.07
1.25
0.10
4.59

0.17
0.07
-0.20
0.05
0.27
-0.07
0.15
-0.02
0.33
0.09
-0.19
0.39
0.23
-0.11
0.35

Variables
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
a

2

3

0.51
-0.28 -0.32
0.22 0.62
0.10 0.07
-0.02 0.20
0.36 0.30
-0.01 -0.07
0.07 0.03
0.12 0.10
-0.28 -0.32
0.49 0.42
0.31 0.32
-0.24 0.01
0.43 0.50

4

5

-0.15
-0.13 -0.03
-0.07 0.19
-0.22 0.34
0.08 -0.02
-0.18 0.07
-0.09 0.09
0.28 -0.26
-0.48 0.23
-0.28 0.22
0.14 0.15
-0.47 0.34

6

0.25
0.00
-0.05
0.28
0.02
0.01
0.25
0.16
-0.22
0.20

7

8

-0.06
0.06 0.00
-0.08 0.12
-0.01 0.10
-0.03 -0.30
-0.10 0.36
0.12 0.33
0.52 -0.10
0.11 0.44

9

10

-0.22
-0.40 0.17
0.09 -0.20
-0.08 0.43
0.08 0.16
0.02 -0.11
-0.05 0.36

11

12

13

-0.15
0.19 -0.60
0.11 -0.40 0.43
-0.04 0.04 -0.27
0.18 -0.67 0.84

14

15

-0.11
0.47 -0.08

n = 352. Correlations greater than | 0.14 | are significant at p < .01

b

Nominated in $ of 2004, using the implicit GDP deflator.

c

Nominated in $-thousands of 2004, using the implicit GDP deflator.
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TABLE 2.
a
Random-effects Regression of Net Transience
Model 1

Property tax rate
Income tax rate
Sales tax rate
Enterprise-Zone programs

Model 2

Model 3

0.02
(0.02)
-1.20 *
(0.50)
-0.27
(0.37)
0.55
(1.64)

0.01
(0.02)
0.33
(1.32)
-0.09
(0.41)
-0.89
(1.96)
-0.01 *
(0.00)
-0.10
(0.16)
0.06
(0.10)

8.67
(2.70)
-1.15
(0.50)
-0.01
(0.04)
5.08
(6.06)
0.24
(0.10)
0.33
(0.79)
2.64
(3.66)
5.40
(4.06)
0.18
(0.14)
3.02
(1.90)
0.09
(0.06)
-2.82
(1.66)

8.83
(2.62)
-1.04
(0.47)
-0.01
(0.04)
3.97
(5.90)
0.18
(0.10)
0.18
(0.76)
6.56
(3.87)
7.59
(4.05)
0.12
(0.14)
1.66
(1.68)
0.11
(0.07)
-2.99
(1.61)

Property-tax x Pers. Income
Income-tax x Pers. Income
Sales-tax x Pers. Income
Control variables:
Firm-birth rate
Industry intensity
Establishment size
Per capita income growth
Population Growth
Change in unemployment rate
Share of high school dropout
Share of college graduates
Ln(SBA loan guarantees per capita)b
Bank offices per capita
Per capita personal incomec
Intercept

X2
d.f.
a

8.75 ***
(2.65)
-1.22 *
(0.49)
0.00
(0.03)
6.04
(5.97)
0.26 **
(0.10)
0.38
(0.80)
2.56
(3.71)
5.76
(3.73)
0.18
(0.14)
2.82
(1.81)
0.08
(0.06)
-2.62
(1.61)
151.45 ***
12

***
*

*

†

159.57 ***
16

***
*

†

†
†

†
†

193.80 ***
19

n = 352, unstandardized regression coefficients, robust standard error in parenthesis, † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005

b

Nominated in $ of 2004, using the implicit GDP deflator.

c

Nominated in $-thousands of 2004, using the implicit GDP deflator.
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FIGURE 1
Relationship between Property Tax and Net Transience at Different
Local Income Levels
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